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on	other,	more	 fundamental	 things,	 like	 a	molecule	 depends	 on	 its	
constituent	atoms	or	a	gaggle	on	its	geese.	These	cases	illustrate	the	
Hierarchy	 Thesis,	 which	 says	 that	 irreflexive,	 asymmetric,	 and	 tran-
sitive	metaphysical	 dependence	 relations	 hierarchically	 structure	 re-
ality.1	Standard	accounts	of	the	ontological	dependence	relation,	the	
metaphysical	grounding	relation,	and	the	proper	parthood	relation	all	
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Mādhyamika	philosopher	Śrīgupta	(ca.	seventh	century)3	in	his	Com-
mentary on the Introduction to Reality (Tattvāvatāravṛtti,	 hereafter	 Intro-




I	will	 then	 turn	 to	 the	positive	phase,	 the	project	of	fleshing	out	
the	picture	that	follows	from	Śrīgupta’s	argument	when	taken	togeth-
er	with	his	 threefold	criterion	 for	conventional	 reality	 (saṃvṛtisatya).	
Here,	 I	will	 present	 a	 two-stage	model,	 first	 showing	 how	 Śrīgupta	
would	 reject	 the	Hierarchy	Thesis	 and	next	 showing	how	he	 could	













Śāntarakṣita	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 extensive	 parallels	 between	 the	 TA/TAV 
and	 Śāntarakṣita’s	MA/MAV.	 It	 is	 Śrīgupta’s	 threefold	 criterion	 for	 conven-
tional	 reality	 that	makes	 it	possible	 to	detail	 the	metaphysical	 indefinitism	
that	I	sketch	in	part	2.	Although	this	criterion	was	adopted	by	a	great	many	
Mādhyamikas	following	Śrīgupta	(see	note	33),	Śrīgupta’s	account	of	conven-



































in	 the	 infinitist	 framework	and	which	 said	 that	 everything	depends	







maka	 anti-foundationalist	 argument	 known	 as	 the	 “neither-one-nor-
many	 argument”	 (ekānekaviyogahetu),	 as	 formulated	 by	 the	 Indian	





1.1. Independent Being and Mereological Dependence
Svabhāva,	 which	 I	 translate	 here	 as	 “independent	 being,”	 literally	
means	 “own-being”	 or	 “being	 per	 se.”7	 We	 might	 also	 characterize	
svabhāva	as	a	kind	of	essential	independence,8	that	is,	a	form	of	onto-
logical	self-sufficiency	that	belongs	to	something	by	its	very	nature.9 
There	 are	 commonly	 two	necessary	 and	only	 jointly	 sufficient	 crite-
ria	that	the	metaphysical	foundationalist	demands	of	foundations:	(i)	
7.	 Unless	otherwise	 indicated,	 I	 translate	 svabhāva	 as	 “independent	being”	 in	
order	 to	highlight	 that	 the	negandum	in	Śrīgupta’s	argument	 is	best	under-




nature,”	 “inherent	 existence.”	 As	 Nāgārjuna	 defines	 it	 in	 his	MMK	 15.2cd,	

















9.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 category	 of	 substance	 is	 commonly	 regarded	 as	 something	
that	 is	 unitary,	 independent,	 self-sufficient,	 and	persisting	 through	 change,	
substantial	being	can	be	helpfully	thought	of	as	a	correlate	to	independent	
being.	However,	given	that	substance	(dravya)	(along	with	God,	universals,	




cal	priority	of	one	 relatum	 to	 the	other	as	demanded	by	 the	Hierar-
chy	Thesis,	which,	given	irreflexivity,	also	precludes	transitivity.	The	
resulting	 structure,	 characterized	 by	 irreflexivity	 and	 extendability,	
admits	of	dependence	loops	of	greater	than	zero	length	(owing	to	ir-
reflexivity)	as	well	as	dependence	chains	of	 indefinite	 length.	And	I	
underscore	 indefinite here	by	contrast	with	 infinite,	where	 indefinite	
signifies	 a	 potential,	mind-dependent	 infinite	 rather	 than	 an	 actual,	










grants	 the	 neither-one-nor-many	 argument	 a	 universal	 scope	 of	 ap-
plication	in	his	Introduction to Reality,6	cementing	its	place	in	the	Mad-
hyamaka	tradition,	for	which	it	came	to	be	popularized	as	one	of	the	
5.	 Bohn	 (2018,	 178	 n.	 38)	 argues	 that	what	 Bliss	 and	 others	 term	 “infinitism”	
is	more	 properly	 “indefinitism.”	 I	 instead	 draw	 a	 distinction	 between	 two	
views,	where	“infinitism”	stands	for	a	dependence	structure	that	allows	for	
dependence	 chains	 that	 are	 actually	 and	mind-independently	 infinite	 and	





mulation	 of	 the	Madhyamaka	 iteration	 of	 the	 neither-one-nor-many	 argu-
ment.	Śāntarakṣita’s	influential	MA is	likely	an	expansion	of	Śrīgupta’s	TAV, 
with	Śrīgupta	taken	by	the	Tibetan	tradition	to	be	the	teacher	of	Śāntaraks ̣ita’s	










able,	despite	our	 inability	 to	physically	divide	objects	 into	 temporal	
parts.	And	the	proper	parts	of	an	abstract	object	 like	a	Euclidean	tri-



















can	 claim	mereological	 independence.	And	on	 Śrīgupta’s	 definition,	
only	something	 that	 lacks	proper	parts	counts	as	a	 true	unity.	Since	
explains	 that	 the	 mark	 of	 something	 that	 is	 merely	 conventionally	 real	
(saṃvṛtisat),	viz.	exists	by	conceptual	designation	(prajñaptisat),	as	opposed	
to	 something	 that	 is	ultimately	or	 substantially	 real	 (dravyasat),	 is	 that	 the	
object	in	question	is	no	longer	cognized	(i)	once	it	has	been	either	actually	
or	conceptually	divided	 into	parts	or	 (ii)	once	 it	has	been	conceptually	ab-
stracted	from	other	properties.	
12.	 See,	 for	 instance,	 Leech	 (2016)	 on	 taking	 seriously	 (rather	 than	 just	meta-
phorically)	the	mereological	structure	of	Kantian	representations.	





In	 making	 their	 case	 against	 ontological	 independence,	




foundations	—	turns	on	 the	universal	 negation	of	mereological	 inde-
pendence.	 Śrīgupta	 takes	 up	 his	 foundationalist	 opponents’	 picture	
of	the	world,	which	is	populated	by	composites	and	parts.	Each	part	
stands	 in	a	proper	parthood	relation	with	some	composite,	where	x 
stands	in	a	proper	parthood	relation	with	y iff	x is	a	part	of	y and	x is	
not	equal	to	y.	And	each	composite	is	mereologically	dependent	on	its	
proper	parts	such	that	a	composite	exists	only	if	its	proper	parts	exist.	




Critical	 for	 his	 argument,	 Śrīgupta	 understands	 the	 mereologi-
cal	dependence	relation	to	be	“topic-neutral,”	that	is,	 it	applies	to	all	
kinds	of	 things.10	The	composite-part	 relation	 is	not	 limited	 to	mate-
rial	 things;	 anything	 that	 can	be	physically	 or	 even	 conceptually	di-
vided	is	partite	—	be	it	a	molecule,	a	mongoose,	or	even	a	mind.	To	be	
sure,	 the	 claim	 that	parthood	 is	 topic-neutral	 is	not	uncontroversial,	
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the	 reason	 (hetu),15	 and	 [e]	denotes	 the	example	 (dṛṣṭānta)	 in	which	
the	entailment	relation	between	the	reason	property	and	predicate	is	
instantiated.	The	operator	“in	reality”	(yang dag tu, *tattvatas)	signals	










Formulated	 in	 the	 standard	 three-part	 inference	 of	 classical	 Bud-
dhist	logic,	the	argument	runs	as	follows:
Thesis	(pratijñā):	
All things lack independent being.  
Major	premise,	statement	of	the	entailment	between	the	
reason	property	and	predicate	(vyāpti):
15.	 Although	 Śrīgupta	 does	 not	 explicitly	 classify	 the	 neither-one-nor-many	
reason,	 it	 is	 commonly	 regarded	 as	 a	 reason	 from	 the	 non-observation	 of	
















mereological	 dependence	 is	 a	 species	 of	 ontological	 dependence,	
mereological	 independence,	 viz.	 simplicity,	 is	 a	necessary	 condition	
for	ontological	independence	and	for	fundamentality.	In	other	words,	




niz	puts	it,	“if	there	is	nothing	truly one,	 then	every	true thing	will	be	
eliminated.”13	Śrīgupta’s	neither-one-nor-many	argument	turns	on	this	







1.2. Śrīgupta’s Neither-One-nor-Many Argument 
In	the	opening	stanza	of	his Introduction to Reality,	Śrīgupta	lays	out	the	
central	inference	of	the	neither-one-nor-many	argument	as	follows:	







14. TA	1:	phyi rol nang na gnas ’di kun // yang dag tu ni rang bzhin med // gcig dang du 
ma’i rang bzhin nyid // bral ba’i phyir na gzugs brnyan bzhin // (PD	3121,	101).	Cf.	
MA	1:	bdag dang gzhan smra’i dngos ’di dag // yang dag tu na cig pa dang // du ma’i 
rang bzhin bral ba’i phyir // rang bzhin med de gzugs brnyan bzhin // (Ichigō	1989,	
190).	MA	1	 is	preserved	 in	Sanskrit	 in	Prajñākaramati’s	BCAP:	niḥsvabhāvā 
amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat // 
(Vaidya	1960,	173).	For	an	English	translation	of	MA	1,	see	Ichigō	(1989,	191).
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Two	further	points	about	the	one-many	pair	in	this	argument	mer-




























20. ’gal ba’i phyir ni rnam pa gzhan // yod par yang ni mi ’thad do // (PD	3121,	101).	
To	the	same	effect,	Śāntarakṣita	states	in	MA	62:	gcig dang du ma ma gtogs par 
// rnam par gzhan dang ldan pa yi // dngos po mi rung ’di gnyis ni // phan tshun 
spangs te gnas phyir ro // (Ichigō	1989,	210);	“Aside	from	unity	and	non-unity,	
an	object’s	having	 some	other	 classification	 is	 impossible,	 since	 it	 is	 estab-
lished	that	these	two	are	mutually	exclusive.”	




All things are neither one nor many. 
This	 argument	 hinges	 on	 the	 reason	 property:	 neither	 one	 nor	
many.	Śrīgupta,	in	effect,	poses	a	destructive	dilemma,	what	I	will	call	
the	“One-or-Many	Dilemma”:	if anything has independent being, then it is 










foundationalist	 structure	on	which	 the	world	bottoms	out	 in	mereo-
logical	simples.	We	can	thus	revise	the	One-or-Many	Dilemma	to	state	
[One-or-Many	Dilemma*]:	 if anything has independent being, then it is 
either one simple or many simples.




defines	“unity”	in	the	context	of	this	argument	as	follows,	MAP ad	k.	1:	cig pa 
zhes bya ba ni cha med pa nyid do //	(Ichigō	1985,	23);	“‘Unity’	refers	to	some-
thing	that	lacks	parts.”
19.	 As	Kamalaśīla	states	in	his	MAP:	cig shos zhes bya ba ni du ma nyid de tha dad 
pa nyid ces bya ba’i tha tshig go //	(Ichigō	1985,	23); “The	alternative	member	
of	the	pair	is	non-unity	(anekatva),	which	is	synonymous	with	‘consisting	in	
discrete	parts’	(bhedatva).” 










P3	A	 foundationalist	metaphysical	 structure	 is	 possible	
only	if	there	is	some	foundation.	
∴	 C2	 A	 foundationalist	 metaphysical	 structure	 is	 not	
possible.
The	real	heavy	 lifting	 is,	of	course,	done	by	P2,	 the	rejection	of	 true	
























is	 thus	 simplified	as	 follows	 [One-or-Many	Dilemma**]:	 if anything 
has independent being, then it is a simple. All	Śrīgupta	needs	to	do	to	es-









being	 fundamental	 in	 these	 senses	 is	 incompatible	 with	 being	 par-
tite.	Yet	Śrīgupta’s	argument	does	not	even	require	his	foundationalist	
21. TAV ad k.	2b:	gcig mang po’i ngo bo yin pas de med na ’di yang mi srid pa … (PD 
3121,	102).	Cf.	MA	61:	dngos po gang gang rnam dpyad pa // de dang de la gcig 
nyid med // gang la gcig nyid yod min pa // de la du ma nyid kyang med // (Ichigō	
1989,	210); “Whatever	object	one	analyzes,	none	has	unity.	Given	that	there	
is	no	unity,	neither	 is	 there	a	non-unity.”	Here,	Śāntarakṣita	closely	glosses	
Āryadeva’s	CŚ	14.19.	See	also	MAV ad	k.	61:	’di ltar du ma ni gcig bsags pa’i mt-
shan nyid do / gcig med na de yang med de / shing la sogs pa med na nags tshal la 
sogs pa med pa bzhin no // (Ichigō	1985,	172);	“Thus,	‘non-unity’	is	defined	as	a	
composite	of	unities.	If	no	unity	exists,	then	neither	does	that	[composite	of	
unities]	exist,	just	like	if	no	trees	exist,	neither	does	a	forest	exist.”	
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Śrīgupta	 first	 targets	material	 simples	 by	 taking	 up	 fundamental	




say,	 a	 right	 side	 and	 a	 left	 side,	 etc.),	 and	whatever	 is	 divisible	 has	
proper	parts.	But	 in	 that	 case,	 fundamental	 particles	would	be	 com-







A	 fundamental	 particle	 could	 not	 be	 a	 [true]	 unity	 be-
cause	an	[extended]	composite	[of	unextended	particles]	
is	impossible.	This	is	because	if	they	were	unitary	in	na-
ture,	 then	 facing	 [particles]	would	 [absurdly]	 occupy	 a	
single	 location.	Nor	 is	 it	 the	 case	 that	 fundamental	 par-
ticles	possessed	of	some	other	kind	of	[extended]	nature	
could	face	with	one	another,	since	in	that	case	it	would	





see	Markosian	 (1998,	 2004a,	 2004b)	 and	McDaniel	 (2007).	 See	McDaniel	
(2003)	for	an	argument	against	extended	simples.
24. TAV ad k.	2a:	rdul phra rab ni gcig pa nyid ma yin te / rang bzhin gcig pu de la mngon 
par phyogs par yul gcig na gnas pas na bsags pa mi rung pa’i phyir ro / rang bzhin 
gzhan gyis mngon du phyogs pa yang ma yin te / du ma nyid du thal bar ’gyur ba’i 
phyir ro // (PD	3121,	102). Here,	Śrīgupta	follows	Vasubandhu’s	line	of	reason-
ing	in	the	Vś 12–13.
Neither-One-nor-Many Argument Reconstruction
P1	 If	 there	 is	 anything	 that	has	 independent	
being,	then	it	is	either	a	true	unity	or	a	true	
non-unity.
Contrapositive of the 
entailment relation 
between the reason 






P4	Whatever	 exists	 is	material	 or	mental	 or	
neither-material-nor-mental.
∴ C1	If	there	is	a	true	unity,	it	is	either	a	mental	










Proof of the predica-
tion of the reason 
property
of the subject
∴ C4	There	 is	 nothing	 that	 has	 independent	
being.	(from	P1,	C2,	C3)	
Thesis
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like	Āryadeva	as	well	as	Yogācāra	Buddhists	 like	Vasubandhu.27	 It	 is	
with	 the	 refutation	of	mental simples	 that	Śrīgupta	makes	a	unique	
philosophical	contribution.




















to	establish	metaphysical	 idealism;	Kellner	and	Taber	 (2014)	 instead	argue	
that	this	section	must	be	understood	within	the	argumentative	context	of	the	
entire	text,	which	represents	an	argumentum ad ignorantiam,	and	that	Vś 11–15	
falls	 under	 the	 section	 in	which	 scriptural	 testimony	 (āgama)	 is	 precluded	
from	 serving	 as	 a	means	by	which	we	 can	 reliably	 gain	 knowledge	of	 the	
existence	of	external	objects.
Śrīgupta	 concludes	 that,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 coherent	 story	 to	 be	 told	
about	how	material	bodies	are	composed	of	either	extended	or	unex-
tended	fundamental	particles,	there	are	no	material	simples.








properties,	 action,	 universals,	 and	 so	 forth,	 are	 indeed	
soundly	rejected.25 
Once	the	foundations	of	a	materialist	foundationalist	structure	are	re-
jected,	Śrīgupta	argues,	 the	rug	has	been	pulled	out	 from	under	 the	
entire	ontological	framework.26 
Taking	himself	at	this	point	in	the	dialectic	to	have	rejected	the	pos-
sibility	 of	material	 simples,	 and	 thus	material	 foundations,	 Śrīgupta	
next	targets	a	range	of	idealist	foundationalist	positions	belonging	to	
his	fellow	Buddhists	from	the	Yogācāra	tradition,	by	rejecting	the	pos-
sibility	 of	 a	 truly	 unitary	mind	 or	mental	 state.	 Śrīgupta’s	 sustained	
attack	on	mental	simples	comprises	his	lengthiest	subargument.	In	his	
rejection	of	material	 simples,	 Śrīgupta	 follows	earlier	Mādhyamikas	
25. TAV ad	k.	3ab: de ltar rtsom byed med pa’i phyir // rdzas la sogs pa thams cad bsal 
// de lta bur rdul phran rang bzhin med pa nyid yin pas na de mngon sum dang / 
gzhan du brtsams pa yan lag can gyi rdzas dang de la brten pa dang / yon tan dang / 
las dang / spyi la sogs pa’ang ring du spangs pa kho na’o // (PD	3121,	102). Cf.	MA 
14–15.	
26.	Here,	 Śrīgupta	 references	 the	 Vaiśeṣika	 ontological	 categories	 (padārtha)	
of	 substances	 (dravya)	—	which	 claim	 fundamental	 particles	 as	 their	 basic	
parts	—	as	well	as	properties	(guṇa),	action	(karma),	universals	(sāmānya),	par-
ticulars	(viśeṣa),	and	the	inherence	relation	(samavāya)	between	a	substance	
and	 its	properties,	etc.,	 all	of	which	are	 indirectly	 founded	 in	 fundamental	
particles	by	virtue	of	ontologically	depending	on	substances	in	one	way	or	
another.
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non-unitary	mental	content	is	non-distinct	from	the	mind,	then	given	
the	LNC,	the	mind	too	is	non-unitary.	(ii)	But	if	mental content is real 
and distinct from the mind,	a	different	problem	crops	up:	If,	as	Śrīgupta’s	
idealist	 foundationalist	 interlocutors	 would	 have	 it,	 mental	 content	




(iii)	 Moving	 to	 the	 other	 horn,	 or	 the	 Real-or-Unreal	 Dilemma,	
Śrīgupta	next	argues	that	if	mental content is unreal and non-distinct from 
the mind,	then	given	the	LNC,	the	mind	too	would	be	unreal,	which	is	
obviously	an	unacceptable	consequence	for	his	idealist	foundational-
ist	opponents.	 (iv)	Finally,	 in	 tackling	 the	view	 that	mental content is 











Finally,	 in	 a	 series	 of	 additional	 subarguments	 targeting	 neither-
material-nor-mental	 simples,	 Śrīgupta	 also	 rejects	 the	 simplicity	 of	
purportedly	 all-pervasive	 entities	 (vyāpin),	 like	 ether	 (ākāśa),	 space	






as	a	 true	unity.	Since	 the	existence	of	a	 true	multitude	presupposes	
Range of Views on the Mind and Mental Content
Śrīgupta	runs	a	multitiered	argument	from	dilemma	relying	heavily	on	
a	version	of	the	law	of	non-contradiction	(LNC),	according	to	which	











Dilemma	on	mental	content.	He	reasons	that	mental content that is real 
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does	not	get	at	 the	heart	of	what	 is	most	 radical	about	 the	Madhya-
maka	picture.	 In	his	neither-one-nor-many	argument,	 Śrīgupta	 runs	
a	 reductio	on	his	 foundationalist	opponents,	 supposing	 that	 a	 strict	









Madhyamaka	 “two	 truths/realities”	 (satyadvaya),31	 in	order	 to	 clarify	
that	the	rejection	of	independent	being	is	not	tantamount	to	nihilism.	
Instead,	his	view	 is	 intended	 to	navigate	a	middle	way	between	 the	
realism	of	foundationalism	and	thoroughgoing	nihilism:32	the	kind	of	
being	and	unity	that	actually	exist	are	merely	conventional.	But	what	
precisely	does	 it	mean	 to	 characterize	 the	being	and	unity	of	 every-
thing	from	an	aardvark	to	an	atom	as	“conventional”?
31.	 The	 semantic	 range	of	 the	 term	 satya includes	 “truth,”	 “reality,”	 “existence,”	
and	“being,”	and	thus	satyadvaya	 is	commonly	translated	as	“two	truths”	as	
well	as	“two	realities.”	In	this	section,	I	translate	saṃvṛtisatya as	“conventional	
existence/being/reality”	 since	 Śrīgupta’s	 definition	 of	 the	 conventional	 de-
scribes	the	manner	of	existence	of	appearances.	However,	below	I	will	also	
discuss	 the	 implications	 of	 Śrīgupta’s	 account	 of	 conventional	 reality	 on	
conventional	truth,	understood	as	the	truth-tracking	claims	we	make	about	




32.	 For	Nāgārjuna	on	Madhyamaka	as	the	middle	way,	see,	 for	 instance,	MMK 
15.2.	Śrīgupta	echoes	this	Madhyamaka	refrain	in	TA	23:	sgro ’dogs pa dang skur 
pa’am // mtha’ gnyis kyi ni rnam spangs pa // ’di ni dbu ma’i lam yin par // seng ge’i 












cal	 dependence	 structure	 do	Mādhyamikas	 endorse?	 This	 question	












transitivity.30	 Though	 a	 helpful	 starting	 place,	 their	 characterization	
29.	Claiming	that	Madhyamaka	endorses	a	metaphysical	dependence	structure	
at	 all	—	or	any	metaphysical	 claims	 for	 that	matter	—	is	not	uncontroversial,	
given	that	many	interpreters	take	Nāgārjuna	to	be	a	skeptic,	a	mystic,	or	an	
anti-metaphysicalist,	 based	 in	 part	 on	 his	 famed	 and	 interpretively	 vexed	
statement	in	VV	k.	29	that	he	has	no	thesis; see	also	YŚ	k.	50.	
30.	See	Bliss	and	Priest	(2018b,	70–71),	where	they	claim	that	Nāgārjuna’s	Mad-
hyamaka	 conforms	 to	 this	 infinitist	 dependence	 structure;	 a	 similar	 paper	
with	this	same	claim	appears	as	Priest	(2018).	In	the	contemporary	space,	the	





















object	 taken	 up	 for	 analysis	 is	 physically	 and/or	 conceptually	 divis-
ible;	nothing	turns	out	to	be	a	true	unity,	ontologically	independent,	
or	 fundamental.	 Instead,	 <unity>	 and	<being>	 are	designated	 in	de-
pendence	 (upādāya prajñapti)	upon	some	proper	parts.36	A	gaggle	 is	
designated,	or	conceived	 in	dependence	on	some	geese,	whereby	 it	
derives	accidental	being	and	accidental	unity.	Yet	the	being	and	unity	
of	an	 individual	goose	 is	also	designated	 in	dependence	on	 its	own	
proper	parts.37	And	aardvarks	and	atoms	are	no	different.	And	with	no	
35.	 One	may	be	reminded	here	of	Hume’s	claim	that	the	distinct	and	continued	





emptiness,	 which	 he	 in	 turn	 identifies	 as	 dependent	 designation.	 See	 Sal-
vini	 (2011)	 for	 an	 argument	 based	 on	 grammatical	 analysis	 in	 support	 of	








(ii)	 is	 interdependently	 originated	 (pratītyasamutpanna),	 and	 (iii)	

















34. TA	11:	ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga’ ste // de ’dra las byung de bzhin no // dngos 
po de dag de lta bu’i // don bya de dang de byed do // (PD	3121,	105); “[1]	Satis-
factory	only	when	not	analyzed,	 [2]	 [things]	arise	 from	[causes]	 similar	 to	
themselves.	[3]	Those	things	enact	their	respective	forms	of	causal	efficacy.”	
The	TAV	continues:	de lta bas na phyi rol dang nang na snang ba’i dngos po brtag 
pa’i spungs mi bzod pa rang dang mthun pa’i rgyus bskyed pa ’di dag ni gang las 
tha snyad ’dir ’gyur ba don bya ba ma brtags na nyams dga’ ba nyid de dang der 







first	criterion	as	 listed	above	possibly	adapted	 from	Candrakīrti	 (e.g.,	MAv	
6.35),	 the	second	inherited	from	Nāgārjuna,	and	the	third	a	repurposing	of	
Dharmakīrti’s	criterion	 for	ultimately	real	particulars	 (svalakṣaṇa)	 in	PV	3.3.	
On	these	three	criteria,	see	also	Eckel	(1987,	137–38	n.	104).















The	 indefinitism	 that	 characterizes	 Madhyamaka	 dependence	
chains	is	a	third	alternative	to	the	infinitism-finitism	dichotomy,	where	
finitism	picks	out	 a	 structure	—	whether	 foundationalist	or	 coherent-
ist	—	wherein	a	finite	quantity	of	relata	stand	in	a	finite	number	of	de-
pendence	relations.	Since	indefinitism	follows	from	the	mind-depen-
dence	of	 the	structure	and	 its	members,43	 it	 is	not	simply	a	claim	of	











agnosticism,	 skepticism,	 criticism,	 dialectic,	 mysticism,	 acosmism,	 absolut-













In	 fact,	 in	 Śrīgupta’s	 presentation	 of	 the	 conventional	 reality	 of	
all	 things,	 he	 glosses	 “things”	 as	 “things	 that	 appear	 externally	 and	
internally.”38	Whatever	exists	conventionally,	 then,	 is	an	appearance,	
which,	by	definition,	exists	 in	 relation	 to	some	cognitive	agent	 inso-








By	 “indefinite,”	 I	 intend	a	kind	of	potential,	mind-dependent	 infi-
nite,	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 actual,	mind-independent	 infinite.	 Indefinite	
characterizes	the	relation	among	members	in	a	series	such	that	for	any	
38.	See	TAV ad 11,	where	Śrīgupta	unpacks	dngos po from	TA	11	as	phyi rol dang 








as	 that	developed	by	Ladyman	and	Ross	 (2007)	and	French	 (2014),	which	
“privileges	 structures	over	 the	 individuals	 individuating	 the	 structures,	 and	
attempts	to	dispense	completely	with	the	notion	of	a	fundamental	 level”	 is	
incompatible	with	the	Madhyamaka	denial	of	 “ultimately	real	entities.”	For	
the	Mādhyamika,	 relations	are	no	more	 fundamental	or	ontologically	 inde-
pendent	than	the	relata	that	they	structure.	




2.2 The Interdependent Origination Criterion and the Structural Properties of 
Madhyamaka Dependence Relations 
So	far,	I’ve	argued	that	from	Śrīgupta’s	first	criterion	for	conventional	
reality	—	that	 the	 being	 and	unity	 of	 a	 conventionally	 real	 thing	 sat-
isfies	 only	when	not	 analyzed	 and	 is	 designated	 in	 dependence	on	
its	proper	parts	—	it	follows	that	Madhyamaka	dependence	chains	are	












To	begin	 to	pin	down	 the	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	Madhyamaka	
dependence	relation	that	obtain	in	both	these	kinds	of	cases,	it	may	be	
helpful	to	contrast	it	with	the	metaphysical	grounding	relation.	
There	 are	 three	 commonly	 accepted	 features	 of	 metaphysical	







46.	 The	 features	 of	metaphysical	 grounding	 are,	 of	 course,	 hotly	 debated,	 but	
















ture	 remains	 finite	 and	 perfectly	 definite	 nonetheless.	 Alternatively,	
one	might	take	“indefinitism”	to	mean	that,	as	 things	stand,	prior	to	
analysis,	it	is	unsettled	as	to	whether	or	not	a	given	object	has	parts;	
that	 is,	when	uninspected,	 an	object	 is	neither	 simple	nor	 complex.
Yet	neither	veiled	finitism	nor	 indefinitism	about	 simplicity	vs.	 com-
plexity	is	what	is	intended	by	the	indefinitism	under	discussion	here.	
Instead,	since	everything	is	necessarily	indefinitely	divisible,	and	since	
divisibility	 is	a	sufficient	criterion	for	being	partite,	 the	fact	 that	any	


















But	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Mādhyamikas	 do	 admit	 of	 instances	 of	 sym-
metrical	 dependence.50	 Indeed,	 the	 term	 for	 dependent	 origination,	
















cāsty arthaḥ kaścid āhetukaḥ kvacit (Ye	2011,	68);	“There	is	nothing	whatsoev-
er	that	exists	without	a	cause.”	On	this	stanza,	see	also	Siderits	and	Katsura	
(2013,	53).
50.	Nāgārjuna	 affirms	 symmetrical	 dependence	 for	 conventionally	 existent	
things.	 See,	 for	 instance,	MMK	 8.12:	 pratītya kārakaḥ karma taṃ pratītya ca 








cal	 dependence	 relations	 have	 thick	 being	 (viz.	 ontologically	 independent	
being).
51.	 In	 fact,	 Candrakīrti	 gives	 one	 possible	 etymology	 of	 saṃvṛti	 (translat-















































































a	human	organism	depends	on	 a	heart,	 but	 the	heart	 also	depends	
on	 the	human	organism.	Two	conventionally	 real	 things	might	 thus	
stand	in	a	mutual	dependence	relation.	This	admission	of	symmetri-
cal	dependence	 taken	 together	with	 the	commitment	 to	 irreflexivity	
prevents	Śrīgupta	from	honoring	transitivity.54	Thus,	unlike	standard	
accounts	of	 the	metaphysical	grounding	relation,	 the	ontological	de-
pendence	 relation,	 and	 the	 proper	 parthood	 relation	—	all	 of	 which	
conform	 to	 the	 Hierarchy	 Thesis	—	Madhyamaka	 dependence	 rela-
tions	are	neither	strictly	asymmetrical	nor	transitive.	
Bliss	and	Priest	(2018a,	2018b)	present	a	taxonomy	of	sixteen	struc-
tures	 of	 reality	 derived	 from	 the	 range	 of	 combinations	 of	 the	 four	
structural	 properties	 of	 irreflexivity,	 asymmetry,	 transitivity,	 and	 ex-
tendability.55	Although	they	assign	Nāgārjuna’s	Madhyamaka	to	a	kind	
of	 infinitism	 that	 accommodates	 all	 four	 of	 these	 properties	 (Struc-
ture	 1	 in	 their	 list,	 an	 infinite	partial	 ordering),	 the	Madhyamaka	of	
Nāgārjuna	and	Śrīgupta	instead	conforms	most	closely	to	Structure	7	





Priest	 argue	 that	 Structure	 7	 (together	with	 the	 other	 non-standard	
permutations	 of	 these	 properties)	 is	 not	 only	 logically	 possible	 but	
53.	 See,	for	instance,	Candrakīrti’s	MAv	6.161ab,	where	he	argues	that,	just	as	a	
whole	cannot	exist	without	parts,	neither	can	parts	exist	without	the	whole,	
suggesting	 their	mutual	 ontological	 dependence:	 sattvaṃ rathasyāsti na cet 
tadānīṃ / vināṅgināṅgāny api santi nāsya	//	(Li	2015,	24).
54.	 To	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	transitivity	was	not	a	concept	that	Śrīgupta	and	
his	 fellow	Mādhyamikas	were	 explicitly	 concerned	with,	 so	 the	 claim	 that	
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as	a	kind	of	reductionism,	is	more	promising	in	this	respect.60	To	the	


















the	existence	of	 something	most	 (or	 least)	 fundamental.61	An	 indefi-
nite	 (or	 infinite)	hierarchical	chain	 is	not	obviously	 incoherent.	The	
fact	that	there	is	nothing	absolutely	fundamental	no	more	precludes	
one	 thing’s	 being	more	 fundamental	 than	 another	 than	 the	 absence	
60.	See,	 for	 instance,	 Siderits	 (2011),	 whose	 objection	—	and	 others	 like	 it	—	is	
based	on	a	Candrakīrtian	reading	of	Madhyamaka.	Indeed,	most	serious	con-





causal/pragmatic	 efficacy	 criterion	 for	 real	 particulars	 as	 one	 of	 his	 three	






be	helpfully	discussed	 in	 terms	of	metaphysical	grounding.	 I	will	 fo-
cus	on	the	mereological	dependence	relation	since	that	looks	like	the	








2.3 The Causal Efficacy Criterion and a Revisable Theory of Conventional 
Truth










its	 flat	 ontology	 is	 unable	 to	 accommodate	 developments	 in	 scien-
tific	explanation	without	resorting	to	a	“dismal	slough”59	of	“anything	
goes”	 relativism,	and	 that	Abhidharma	Buddhism,	 for	 instance,	 read	

















A	 strict	 hierarchic	 and	 reductionist	 ontology	may	 encourage	 the	
thought	that	there	is	a	single	privileged	way	of	carving	up	and	order-
ing	the	world.	But	the	Madhyamaka	flexible	ontology	can	recognize	
scientific	 insights	 while	 also	 granting	 legitimacy	 to	 other	 ways	 of	
thinking	about	the	world,	e.g.,	to	recognizing	a	certain	kind	of	priority	
not	just	to	quarks	and	leptons,	or	strings	in	ten-dimensional	space,	but	
also	 to	plants,	animals,	people,	and	even	—	if	 it	 is	useful	—	countries	
and	corporations.	
But	 conventional	 truths	—	as	 the	 truth-tracking	 claims	 we	 make	
about	 conventionally	 real	 things	 and	 structures	—	are	 not	 simply	
claims	 that	 are	 commonly	 accepted	within	 a	 given	 society	 (lokapra-







1133).	 In	his	MAP	(Ichigō	1985,	203),	Kamalaśīla	 resists	 the	definition	“con-
ventional	truth”	according	to	which	it	signifies	commonly	accepted	linguistic-
cognitive	practices.	For	a	translation	and	discussion	of	the	relevant	passage	
in	SN,	see	Tillemans	 (2011,	 153–54),	where	Kamalaśīla	 rebuts	an	unnamed	
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Conclusion
I	 have	offered	a	preliminary	 sketch	of	 a	 two-stage	model	 for	under-
standing	 the	 metaphysical	 dependence	 structure	 that	 follows	 from	
Śrīgupta’s	 rejection	 of	 ontological	 independence	 in	 his	 neither-one-
nor-many	argument,	when	 taken	 together	with	his	 three	criteria	 for	









represents	 an	 alternative	model	 to	 the	 three	 standard	 categories	 of	
metaphysical	foundationalism,	infinitism,	and	coherentism.	
Second,	 since	 this	 flexible	 ontology	 can	 support	 a	 contextualist	
form	of	the	Hierarchy	Thesis,	it	can	respect	certain	hierarchical	struc-
tures	(as	well	as	non-hierarchical	structures),	but	whatever	structure	
is	 admitted	must	 be	 earned	 by	 its	 pragmatic	 upkeep.	 And	 with	 its	
revisable	 theory	 of	 conventional	 truth,	 Śrīgupta’s	Madhyamaka	 can	
accommodate	 the	 best	 scientific	 explanations	 of	 the	 day,	 with	 the	
(rather	sizable)	caveat	that	it	can	never	admit	ontologically	indepen-
dent	fundamentalia.	This	two-stage	analysis	is	not	only	a	picture	that	










son	 (prekṣāvat),64	 that	 is,	 an	 ideal	 epistemic	 agent,	 differentiates	 be-
tween	 true	 and	 false	 conventions	 (tathyasaṃvṛti and	mithyāsaṃvṛti),	
verifying	 the	 pragmatic	 efficacy	 of	 a	 given	 claim	 or	 theory	 by	 uti-





















64.	For	a	discussion	of	Kamalaśīla’s	 account	of	 a	discerning	person	 (prekṣāvat),	
see	McClintock	 (2010,	 58–62;	2013)	and	Tillemans	 (2016,	 143–44);	on	 this	
term,	see	also	Eltschinger	(2007,	137–50;	2014,	195	n.	17,	219–34).
65.	 This	 is,	 of	 course,	 consistent	with	 the	 reclassification	 of	 testimony	 (śabda)	
as	a	subcategory	of	inference	(anumāna)	 in	the	epistemological	tradition	of	
Dignāga	 and	 Dharmakīrti,	 a	 tradition	 followed	 by	 so-called	 *Svātantrika-
Mādhyamikas,	including	Śrīgupta,	Śāntarakṣita,	and	Kamalaśīla.	This,	again,	
should	 be	 contrasted	 with	 Mādhyamikas	 like	 Candrakīrti	 who	 rejected	
Dignāgian	epistemology.
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